Hamas cannot be contained. It must be dismantled: militarily, politically, and administratively.
Following the collapse of the ceasefire and Hamas’s rejection of the hostage deal, Israel has no alternative but to pursue this objective decisively and in full, and the recently-approved Chariots of Gideon operation, which will include the army remaining in conquered areas longer-term to prevent the rebuilding of terror infrastructure, is a promising step toward these objectives.
Anything short of that will leave the Gaza Strip a launchpad for future attacks and the Israeli home front exposed to continued threat.
The campaign, as it has been carried out until now, cannot make do with just degrading Hamas’s capabilities temporarily. It must remove Hamas as the ruling authority in Gaza, separating it from the civilian population that it uses for cover and leverage. That requires more than firepower. It requires control – over territory, over humanitarian aid, and over the conditions that allow the organization to regenerate after each round of combat.
How will the IDF handle Hamas in the future?
In past operations, the IDF applied the “raid method” – entering enemy areas, destroying targets, and withdrawing. That approach has proven inadequate. It has allowed Hamas to survive, reorganize, and present each round of fighting as a strategic achievement.
By contrast, in areas where Israel has held territory, such as the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, Hamas has suffered meaningful losses, and its leadership has expressed concern about the shift in Israeli operational posture.
That posture must now be applied consistently. The objective is not merely to enter and strike, but to stay and dismantle. Captured areas must be cleared, held, and governed, even if only temporarily, by forces that prevent the return of Hamas control, whether overt or indirect.
This requires a parallel policy for managing the civilian environment. The primary lever Hamas uses to maintain power and international relevance is its control over the civilian population. During the last ceasefire, it diverted humanitarian aid for its own use, deepening its hold on the Strip.
TO COUNTER this, Israel must establish humanitarian zones under indirect security oversight. These zones should be administered by vetted international organizations with logistical and protective support provided by private security contractors. This approach has been used successfully in the past. It would reduce civilian exposure to combat, allow for more focused operations in Hamas-controlled zones, and deny the organization access to the population it exploits.
Within these areas, conditions should also be created to enable voluntary emigration. While politically sensitive, this option must be addressed realistically. Gaza’s long-term instability is not only a function of Hamas’ power but of a deeply entrenched ideological environment that supports continued armed resistance. Deradicalization efforts have little chance of success, and reconstruction alone will not shift the strategic calculus.
Those in Gaza who no longer wish to live under Hamas rule or in the shadow of continuous conflict should be given the opportunity to leave. Most of the population holds refugee status under international law and is eligible for resettlement support. International frameworks exist that can assist with such processes, provided there is political will and strategic coordination. Emigration should not be imposed, but it should be facilitated for those who seek it.
None of this is possible without full Israeli control over the Gaza crossings and the Philadelphi Corridor, both above and below ground. Nor is it possible without a sustained Israeli presence in the Strip.
Gaza should be divided into territorial sectors, each managed by a dedicated operational command, with capabilities for intelligence gathering, area control, and population oversight.
This model, which has been proven in Judea and Samaria, where it has been in force since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, provides the only viable structure for preventing Hamas’s return and for stabilizing the area over time.
The hostages remain a national priority. However, Hamas’s current demands, including the full withdrawal of Israeli forces, render a comprehensive deal unfeasible under current conditions. Partial releases may be possible, but only under sustained military pressure.
This war is being closely watched in Tehran and by its proxies. The outcome in Gaza will shape the strategic environment in the region for years to come.
If Hamas remains in power, it will serve as proof to Iran and its proxies that Israel lacks the will or capacity to finish what it starts. If Hamas is removed – not just militarily, but as a ruling authority – the signal will be the opposite.
Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni is a senior consultant to the Israel Defense Forces.He served as director of the military and strategic affairs program and the cyber research program of the Institute for National Security Studies from 2006-2020.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Erez Wiener is an expert in military affairs and doctrine at the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security. He served in key command roles in the IDF, including as commander of the Duchifat Battalion and the Etzioni Brigade, as aide to the chief of staff, and as head of the Southern Command operational planning team.